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defending Victims of domestic abuse who Kill : 
a Perspective from english Law 
George M o u s o u r a k is 
The term “cumulative provocation” is used to describe cases 
involving a prolonged period of maltreatment of a person at the hands 
of another, which culminates in the killing of the abuser by her victim. 
Since the early 1990s there has been a plethora of academic commentary 
on the criminal law’s response to such cases. More recently, the debate 
has been re-opened following the publication of the English Law Commis-
sion’s proposals on the partial defences to murder. This article examines 
doctrinal issues that arise in relation to claims of extenuation stemming 
from the circumstances of cumulative provocation. It is argued that, 
given the scope and limitations of the provocation defence, one should 
view the circumstances of cumulative provocation as likely to bring about 
the conditions of different legal excuses. Identifying the relevant legal 
defence would require one to refect on the nature of the excusing condi-
tion or conditions stemming from the circumstances of each particular 
case. Although the paper draws largely upon the doctrines of provoca-
tion and diminished responsibility as they operate in English law, it is 
hoped that the analysis offered has relevance to all systems where similar 
defences are recognized (or proposed to be introduced), and can make a 
useful contribution to the continuing moral debate that the partial excuses 
to murder generate. 
La « provocation cumulative » désigne les instances de mauvais trai-
tements, pendant une période prolongée, d’une personne par une autre et 
qui se terminent par le meurtre de l’auteur par la victime d’abus. Depuis 
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le début des années 90, la doctrine a abondamment commenté la manière 
dont le droit pénal appréhende de telles situations. Dernièrement, le débat 
a refait surface dans la foulée de la publication des propositions de la Law 
Commission d’Angleterre sur les moyens de défense partiels à l’accusa-
tion de meurtre. Le présent article examine les enjeux que soulève l’appel 
à des circonstances de provocation cumulative pour diminuer la respon-
sabilité criminelle. Compte tenu de la portée et des limites inhérentes à 
la défense de provocation, il convient d’envisager les circonstances de la 
provocation cumulative comme étant susceptibles de fonder le recours à 
d’autres moyens de défense. Circonscrire le moyen de défense juridique 
le plus approprié nécessiterait de se pencher sur la nature de la condition 
ou des conditions disculpatoires qui découlent de chaque cas déterminé. 
Bien que cet article se fonde en grande partie sur les doctrines de la provo-
cation et de la responsabilité diminuée telles qu’elles sont appliquées en 
droit anglais, il est à espérer que l’analyse proposée aura sa pertinence 
pour tous les régimes de droit qui reconnaissent l’existence de tels moyens 
de défense (ou qui se proposent de les mettre en œuvre) et qu’elle pourra 
être d’un apport utile au débat moral suscité par les moyens de défense 
partiels à l’accusation de meurtre . 
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The term “cumulative provocation” refers to cases involving a prolonged 
period of physical or psychological abuse of a person by someone with 
whom she has an intimate or familiar relationship, which culminates in 
the killing of the abuser by her victim. A long course of domestic violence 
which ends up in the killing of one spouse by the other provides the typical 
example here. In such cases the killer may plead provocation as her defence 
to murder, arguing that the provocation she was subjected to was the abuse 
she suffered at the victim’s hands. She might claim that the abusive behav-
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iour would have had the same effect on just anyone, or she might argue that, 
as a result of her previous experiences of maltreatment, she was provoked 
to lose self-control and kill by something which would not have provoked a 
reasonable or ordinary person. She might also claim, either alternatively or 
instead of this, that the abuse she suffered at the victim’s hands had such an 
effect on her as to make her different from other people in some important 
respects, and that this should be taken into consideration when her plea is 
assessed. With regard to cumulative provocation, a distinction should be 
drawn between cases in which the accused’s retaliation was immediately 
preceded and precipitated by some sort of provocative conduct, and cases 
in which no such fnal provocation did in fact occur. The accused’s plea for 
a partial excuse in both types of cases turns upon the whole of the victim’s 
abusive behaviour towards the accused ; it does not hinge upon a single act 
of provocation deemed suffcient by itself to trigger off a punitive reaction 
likely to involve an intent to kill. 
This paper examines doctrinal issues that arise in relation to claims 
of extenuation stemming from the circumstances of cumulative provoca-
tion. Some of these issues pertain to the incident or conduct relied upon as 
constituting provocation. The incident may be of a type that is not normally 
recognised as provocation, or it may not be a serious enough example of 
a recognised type. Another set of questions arise in relation to the way in 
which an accused has retaliated, even where a provocative event can be 
demonstrated. Indeed, of the cases of cumulative provocation the most 
problematic are those in which the immediacy requirement of provocation 
is not met. The accused may have responded calmly and after deliberating 
on what retaliatory action is required. Often the lapse of time between the 
last provocative incident and the accused’s retaliation would appear to 
suggest that she acted with forethought and deliberation. Could the accused 
rely on a defence even if her response did not follow immediately upon the 
provocation, or if the accused did not lose her self-control, in the sense of 
ceasing to act calmly and rationally ? It is argued that, given the limitations 
of the current defnition of the provocation defence in English law, one 
should view the circumstances of cumulative provocation as likely to bring 
about the conditions of different legal excuses. Identifying the relevant legal 
defence would require one to refect on the nature of the excusing condition 
or conditions stemming from the circumstances of each particular case. 
1 Cumulative Provocation and the Scope of the Provocation Defence 
In England and other common law jurisdictions provocation operates 
as a mitigatory or partial defence to murder aimed at the reduction of that 
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offence to voluntary (or intentional) manslaughter1. For a plea of provoca-
tion to succeed the jury must be satisfed that the accused was deprived of 
her self-control at the time of the killing (the subjective test) and that this 
was the result of wrongful conduct serious enough to provoke an ordinary 
or reasonable person (the objective test). If there is no evidence to support 
a fnding of provocation, the defence will fail, whether the accused lost her 
self-control or not. Moreover, even if the victim’s conduct was such as to 
amount to provocation in law, the defence cannot be relied upon if evidence 
shows that the accused did not lose self-control as a result. Determining 
the threshold of legal provocation presupposes a moral judgment about 
what sort of offensive conduct is capable of arousing in a person such a 
degree of justifed anger or indignation that might defeat her capacity for 
1. According to the Homicide Act, 1957 (U.K.), 5 & 6, Eliz. II, c. 11, s. 3 : “Where on a 
charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can fnd that the person charged was 
provoked (whether by things done or by things said or by both together) to lose his self-
control, the question whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do 
as he did shall be left to be determined by the jury ; and in determining that question the 
jury shall take into account everything both done and said according to the effect which, 
in their opinion, it would have on a reasonable man.” The Law Commission recently 
published a detailed Consultation Paper reviewing the present law and proposing a series 
of possible options for reform. See : U.K., la w Co M M issio n , A New Homicide Act for 
England and Wales ?, Consultation Paper No. 177 (2005), p . 171-176, [En ligne], [www. 
lawcom.gov.uk/docs/cp177_web.pdf] (19 September 2007) and U.K., la w Co M M issio n , 
Partial Defences to Murder, Report No. 290 (2004), p . 30-72, [En ligne], [www.lawcom. 
gov.uk/docs/lc290pn.pdf] (19 September 2007). S. 232 of the Canadian Criminal Code, 
R.S.C. (1985), c. C-46 states : 
(1) Culpable homicide that otherwise would be murder may be reduced to mans-
laughter if the person who committed it did so in the heat of passion caused by 
sudden provocation. (2) A wrongful act or an insult that is of such nature as to 
be suffcient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control is provo-
cation for the purposes of this section if the accused acted on it on the sudden 
and before there was time for his passion to cool. (3) For the purposes of this 
section, the questions (a) whether a particular wrongful act or insult amounted 
to provocation, and (b) whether the accused was deprived of the power of self-
control by the provocation that he alleges he received, are questions of fact, but 
no one shall be deemed to have given provocation to another by doing anything 
that he had a legal right to do, or by doing anything that the accused incited him 
to do in order to provide the accused with an excuse for causing death or bodily 
harm to any human being. 
In Canada a person who is convicted of murder is subject to a fxed sentence 
of life imprisonment with a minimum period of parole ineligibility of twenty-
fve years where the person is found guilty of frst degree murder and ten years 
where she is found guilty of second degree murder (ss. 235 and 745 Cr.C.). In 
contrast, as in other common law jurisdictions, where an accused is found guilty 
of manslaughter, the judge may impose any sentence up to a maximum period of 
life imprisonment (s. 236 Cr.C.). 
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self-control. Although legal wrongdoings of a signifcant nature should for 
the most part provide a suffcient basis for the defence, non-legal, moral 
wrongdoings may also be considered serious enough to pass the threshold 
of provocation in law. Over this threshold, provocations may vary from the 
less serious ones (e.g. verbal provocations) to those involving very serious 
wrongdoings (e.g. provocations involving physical violence). Provocations 
involving different forms and degrees of wrongdoing may equally support 
a partial defence to murder, provided that the requirement of loss of self-
control is also satisfed2. 
The provocation defence is understood to hinge upon two interrelated 
elements : the wrongful act of provocation and impaired volition or loss of 
self-control. The frst element is taken to be justifcatory in character, for 
it focuses upon a condition that, on the face of it, is capable of affecting 
the wrongfulness of the actor’s conduct quite independently of her state 
of mind. The second element, by placing the emphasis on the actor’s state 
of mind and her inability to exercise control over her actions, is clearly 
excusative in nature. Because provocation rests upon both excusative and 
justifcatory considerations, the rationale of the legal defence has been 
diffcult to locate3. As Alldridge has remarked : 
The defence [of provocation] must be either a partial excuse (in which case the 
centre of the inquiry will be whether or not the defendant lost his/her self-control) 
or a partial justifcation (in which case the centre of the inquiry will be what was 
actually done by the deceased to the defendant — to what extent the deceased 
2. In Canada the defence of provocation, as provided for by s. 232 Cr.C., has four elements : 
(a) a wrongful act or insult ; (b) the wrongful act must be capable of depriving an ordinary 
person of the power of self-control ; (c) the accused must have actually been provoked 
to lose her self-control by the wrongful act or insult ; and (d) both the wrongful act or 
insult and the accused’s response to it must have been sudden. This defnition of the 
defence is more complex than the one adopted in England, although it is based on the 
English Draft Criminal Code of 1879 : U.K., “Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Law relating to Indictable Offences”, Command 2345 in British Parliamentary Papers, 
Shannon, Irish University Press, 1971, Legal Administration : Criminal Law, vol. 6 
(1847-1879), “Appendix : Draft Criminal Code (Indictable Offences), 1879”, p . 417, s. 176. 
See : D. s tua r t , Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed., Scarborough, Ont., Carswell, 2001, 
p. 533-544. 
3. As Austin has noted, “It is arguable that we do not use the terms justifcation and excuse 
as we might ; a miscellany of even less clear terms, such as “extenuation”, “palliation”, 
“mitigation”, hovers uneasily between partial justifcation and partial excuse ; and when 
we plead, say, provocation, there is genuine uncertainty or ambiguity as to what we 
mean – is he partly responsible, because he roused a violent passion in me, so that it 
wasn’t truly or merely me acting “of my own accord” (excuse) ? Or is it rather that, he 
having done me such injury, I was entitled to retaliate (justifcation) ?” : J.L. au s t in , 
“A Plea for Excuses”, in A.R. wh it e (ed.), The Philosophy of Action, London, Oxford 
University Press, 1968, 19, p . 20.. 
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“asked for it”) […] It is interesting to note that both these conditions obtained at 
common law4. 
Although the justifcatory element may have played a part in the shaping 
of the legal doctrine of provocation, its role in modern law is diminished. 
The idea that an act of revenge may be partially justifed conficts with 
fundamental presuppositions of the criminal law as a system whose very 
point is shifting the authority and moral basis of actions from the domain of 
subjective attitudes to general and impersonal norms of conduct5. Although 
for the defence of provocation to succeed it must be established that the 
accused was suffciently wronged by her victim, the rationale of the defence 
in law is more satisfactorily explained in terms of the excuse theory. The 
real basis of the provocation defence, traditionally regarded as a concession 
to human frailty, lies in the actor’s loss of self-control in circumstances in 
which any ordinary person might also have lost control6. In this respect, 
the wrongful act of provocation is seen as providing a morally acceptable 
explanation for the accused’s loss of self-control and killing rather than a 
reason for directly reducing the wrongfulness of her actions. 
In a number of provocation cases involving a history of abuse the 
jury was directed to take into account the previous maltreatment of the 
accused by her victim as relevant to assessing the gravity of the provo-
cation offered. Thus an act which, on its own, may not be suffcient to 
amount to provocation, when considered in the light of previous provoca-
tive acts or words may be regarded as serious enough to cause the accused 
to lose her self-control7. Although considering the previous mistreatment 
4. P. a l l d r id g e , “The Coherence of Defences”, [1983] Crim. L. Rev. 665, p . 669. See also : 
J. d ress le r , “Rethinking Heat of Passion : A Defense in Search of a Rationale”, (1982) 
73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 421 ; J. d ress le r , “Provocation : Partial Justifcation or 
Partial Excuse ?”, (1988) 51 Mod. L. Rev. 467. 
5. As Hirsch and Jareborg have pointed out, “although the [provoker] might deserve punis-
hment, the actor lacks authority to infict it. Penalizing malefactors is not a legitimate 
role for an individual ; it is a state function, to be undertaken with appropriate due 
process safeguards” : A.V. hir s C h and N. Ja r e b o r g , “Provocation and Culpability”, in 
F . sChoeMan (ed.), Responsibility, Character and the Emotions, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1987, p . 242. 
6. As Lord Goddard C.J. pointed out in R. v. Duffy, [1949] 1 All E.R. 932, 932 (C.A.), 
“circumstances which induce a desire for revenge are inconsistent with provocation, 
since the conscious formulation of a desire for revenge means that a person has had time 
to think, to refect, and that would negative a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, 
which is of the essence of provocation”. 
7. As Lord Widgery C.J. stated in R. v. Davies, [1975] Q.B. 691, 702 (C.A.), the “background 
is material to the provocation as the setting in which the state of mind of the defendant 
must be adjudged”. Similarly, in Luc Thiet Thuan v . R., [1996] 2 All E.R. 1003, 1047, 
Lord Goff stated : “it may be open to a defendant to establish provocation in circums-
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of the accused by the victim may be relevant to assessing the seriousness 
of the provocation offered, such a consideration would be very diffcult 
on its own to support a partial excuse on the basis of provocation. If a 
fnal wrongdoing triggering off the accused’s reaction cannot be identifed, 
the accused’s claim that she was provoked would be diffcult to accept. 
Even in some cases where a fnal act of provocation can be identifed, it 
may seem questionable whether the accused’s plea of provocation should 
succeed8. The assumption that the act of provocation was, in the circum-
stances, foreseeable, or that the accused was in a sense used to the victim’s 
abusive behaviour, may seem to militate against the basic presuppositions 
of the provocation defence9. In general, evidence of planning and delib-
eration would be fatal to the accused’s plea, as it would tend to negative 
the element of loss of control as required by the defnition of the defence. 
Provoked killings are expected to be impulsive. They are also expected 
to happen quickly, following immediately upon the act of provocation. 
In several cases the position was adopted that a delay amounts to time in 
tances in which the act of the deceased, though relatively unprovocative if taken in 
isolation, was the last of a series of acts which fnally provoked the loss of self-control 
by the defendant and so precipitated his extreme reaction which led to the death of the 
deceased”. And see : R. v . Simpson, [1957] Crim. L.R. 815 ; R. v. Fantle, [1959] Crim. L.R. 
584 ; R. v. McCarthy, [1954] 2 Q.B. 105 (C.A.) ; Bullard v . R., [1957] A.C. 635 (J.C.) ; R. 
v . Humphreys, [1995] 4 All E.R. 1008 (C.A.) ; R. v . Weller, [2004] 1 Cr. App. R. 1 (C.A.). 
Similarly, Canadian courts have interpreted both the objective and subjective elements 
in provocation in a broad manner, requiring that the trier of fact take into consideration 
all relevant factors, including the accused’s mental condition and any prior relationship 
she may have had with the deceased, in determining whether the accused was actually 
provoked to lose her self-control. It is recognized that the test to be applied is whether 
an ordinary person of the same age and sex, and in the same situation or circumstances 
as the accused, would have been deprived of the power of self-control by the relevant 
wrongful act or insult. See e.g. : R. v. Krawchuk (1940), 75 C.C.C. 16, [1941] 2 D.L.R. 
353, [1941] 3 W.W.R. 540 (S.C.C.) ; Wright v . R., [1969] S.C.R. 335, 340 ; R. v . Conway 
(1985), 17 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.) ; R. v. Hill, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 313, p. 332-333 ; R. v . 
Thibert, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 37. 
8. See : A. ash w o rth , “Sentencing in Provocation Cases”, [1975] Crim. L. Rev. 553. 
9. According to Gordon, “It is doubtful whether a long course of provocative conduct can 
found a successful plea of provocation, unless there is also some fnal act of provocation 
which, albeit because it follows on the earlier provocation and is the last straw, actually 
provokes a loss of control — it is not suffcient that it should merely provide an occa-
sion for [the accused] to exact revenge for the deceased’s prior provocation. The fact 
that the deceased had indulged in a course of provocative conduct may indeed in some 
circumstances militate against the plea of provocation, as showing that [the accused] 
had become so used to this type of behaviour that it no longer affected his self-control” : 
G.H. gord on , The Criminal Law of Scotland, 2nd ed., Edinburg, Green, 1978, p. 766. 
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which the accused should have cooled down and regained her composure10. 
In Thornton11, for example, the Court of Appeal took the view that loss 
of self-control following immediately after the provocative conduct of the 
deceased remained an essential element of the provocation defence. The 
same position was adopted in Ahluwalia12, where the loss of self-control 
requirement was described as an essential ingredient of the provocation 
defence, serving to underline that the defence is concerned with the actions 
of an individual who is not, at the moment when she acts violently, master 
of her own mind13. It was pointed out in that case that a sudden and tempo-
rary loss of self-control at the time of the killing is vital to the defence14. 
10. See e.g. : R. v . Duffy, supra, note 6 ; R. v . Brown, [1972] 2 All E.R. 1328 (C.A.) ; R. v. 
Davies, supra note 7 ; R. v . Ibrams (1981), 74 Cr. App. R. 154 (C.A.) ; R. v . Turner, [1975] 
Q.B. 834, [1975] 1 All E.R. 70 (C.A.) ; R. v . Burke (1986), 82 Cr. App. R. 156 (C.A.) ; R. 
v. Newell (1980), 71 Cr. App. R. 331 (C.A.) ; R. v . Raven, [1982] Crim. L.R. 51 ; R. v . 
Cocker, [1989] Crim. L.R. 740 (C.A.). Similarly, courts in Canada have traditionally 
adopted the view that the suddenness requirement in relation to the accused’s response 
to the provocative conduct will not be met if the accused had prior knowledge of the 
act or insult claimed to constitute provocation. As stated in R. v. Tripodi, [1955] S.C.R. 
438, 443, for the suddenness requirement to be satisfed, the wrongful act or insult “must 
strike upon a mind unprepared for it […] it must make an unexpected impact that takes 
the understanding by surprise and sets the passions afame”. 
11. R. v . Thornton, [1992] 1 All E.R. 306 (C.A.). In this case a woman suffering from “battered 
woman syndrome” went to the kitchen, took and sharpened a knife, and returned to stab 
her husband. She was convicted of murder and appealed on the grounds that instead 
of considering the fnal provocative incident, the jury should have been directed to 
consider the events over the years leading up to the killing. This argument was rejected, 
however, on the grounds that “in every such case the question for the jury is whether at 
the moment the fatal blow was struck the accused had been deprived for that moment of 
the self-control which previously he or she had been able to exercise” (per Beldam L.J.) 
(p. 314). But in R. v . Thornton (No. 2), [1996] 2 All E.R. 1023 (C.A.), after examining new 
medical evidence, a retrial was ordered and the accused was convicted of manslaughter 
on the grounds of diminished responsibility. 
12. R. v . Ahluwalia, [1992] 4 All E.R. 889 (C.A.). As in Thornton, following the accused’s 
conviction of murder at frst instance, a retrial was ordered and, when the defence of 
diminished responsibility was put, the accused was convicted of manslaughter. 
13. Lord Taylor said in that case : “Time for refection may show that after the provoca-
tive conduct made its impact on the mind of the defendant, he or she kept or regained 
self-control. The passage of time following the provocation may also show that the 
subsequent attack was planned or based on motives, such as revenge or punishment, 
inconsistent with the loss of self-control and therefore with the defence of provocation. 
In some cases, such an interval may wholly undermine the defence of provocation ; that, 
however, depends entirely on the facts of the individual case and is not a principle of 
law” (R. v. Ahluwalia, supra, note 12, 895-896). 
14. Also see : U.K., C r i M i n a l l a w r e V is io n Co M M it t e e , Offenses Against the Person : 
Homicide, 14th Report, London, H.M.S.O., 1980, para. 84 [hereinafter : 14th Report]. 
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The above approach has been criticised on the grounds that it over-
looks the important requirement that a conviction of murder should be 
avoided unless the accused fully deserves to be stigmatised as a murderer. 
In some cases of cumulative provocation, evidence of planning and delib-
eration is not suffcient to warrant, morally, the accused’s conviction of 
murder15. It is pointed out that the position that the scope of the crime 
of murder should be narrowed down to include only those killings which 
deserve to be stigmatised as murders militates against the outright rejection 
of the provocation defence where the immediacy requirement is not met. 
Strict adherence to this requirement may lead, in some cases of cumulative 
provocation, to convictions of murder that may be regarded as morally 
questionable16. Since Ahluwalia, in cases of battered women who kill, a 
lapse of time of itself is no longer suffcient to negate provocation. It is 
now recognized that where the provocation is cumulative, especially in 
those circumstances where the accused is found to have suffered domestic 
violence from the victim over a long period of time, the required loss of 
self-control may not be sudden as some persons experience a “slow-burn” 
reaction and appear calm17. 
In general, the tendency in English law is towards treating the accused 
in cases involving cumulative provocation with leniency. Often the judge 
is prepared to accept the accused’s plea of not guilty to murder but guilty 
to manslaughter directly. There have been cases in which the accused was 
found guilty of manslaughter only, in spite of evidence suggesting that 
she did not kill her victim “on the spur of the moment”. For example, in 
Maw and Maw18, the accused, two sisters, killed their violent and drunken 
father by stabbing him with a kitchen knife. On the night of the killing, the 
father assaulted and abused the accused and their mother. In the fght that 
15. According to Wasik, “in defning the ambit of the defence [of provocation] a balance has 
to be struck between the refection of contemporary attitudes of sympathy towards the 
defendants in such cases [of cumulative provocation] and the duty of self-control upon 
every citizen by the law” : M. wa s ik , “Cumulative Provocation and Domestic Killing”, 
[1982] Crim. L. Rev. 29, 35. 
16. See : M. wa s ik , loc. cit., 37 ; 14th Report, supra, note 14, para. 15, 19, 84. 
17. Similarly, in Canada the strictness of the suddenness requirement appears to have been 
relaxed in recent years. See e.g. : R. v . Thibert, supra, note 7 (in this case the Supreme 
Court accepted that the provocation defence was a viable one despite the fact that the 
accused’s behaviour prior to the killing did not preclude a degree of forethought). It 
has been suggested by some commentators, however, that the recent decision of the 
Supreme Court in R. v. Parent, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 761, points towards a return to a stricter 
suddenness requirement. See : D. s tua r t , “Annotation – R. v . Parent”, (2001) 41 C.R. 
(5th) 200 ; W. gorMan , “Comment : R. v . Parent”, (2002) 45 Crim. L.Q. 412. 
18. Maw and Maw, The Times, August 20, November18, 19, 20, 21, 22, Dec. 4, 15,16 
(1980). 
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followed he was struck on the head by a heavy mirror and was knocked 
unconscious. While he was unconscious the accused agreed that, if he used 
violence on them or their mother again, they would kill him. When the 
victim regained consciousness and began using violence, he was stabbed 
to death by one of the sisters with a knife. The jury found the two accused 
guilty of manslaughter and not murder on the grounds that they had acted 
under provocation19. 
But what is the precise nature of the legal defence or defences that 
may stem from the circumstances of cumulative provocation ? Wasik puts 
forward three possible ways in which this question may be answered. 
First, cases of cumulative provocation may be dealt with under the existing 
defence of provocation. This, he argues, would presuppose an interpreta-
tion of the provocation defence that would place suffcient emphasis on the 
justifcatory as well as on the excusative element in provocation. Under 
this broader interpretation, provocation would not always depend upon a 
sudden and temporary loss of self-control. Despite evidence of forethought 
and deliberation, the defence could succeed if the accused’s resentment 
against the victim is justifed in the light of the abuse she suffered at the 
latter’s hands. Secondly, cases involving cumulative provocation may be 
treated under the defence of diminished responsibility or, perhaps, under a 
combined defence of provocation and diminished responsibility. However, 
according to Wasik, such an approach to the matter might result in a misun-
derstanding as regards the rationale and purpose of the diminished respon-
sibility defence. Thirdly, such cases might be dealt with under a separate 
defence to murder. The ambit of such a defence should be drawn wide 
enough to encompass a variety of extenuating circumstances that may 
justify the reduction of culpability for homicide20. Wasik regards the frst of 
these three possible approaches to the problem of cumulative provocation 
as comparatively the least troublesome21. 
It seems diffcult, however, to view all cases of cumulative provocation 
as capable of being treated under a single legal defence. Rather, cumula-
tive provocation should be regarded as a situation likely to give rise to 
the conditions of different legal defences. Instead of widening the scope 
of the existing defence categories in order to accommodate all cumulative 
19. See also : Wright, The Times, October 14 (1975) ; Ratcliffe, The Times, May 13 (1980) ; 
Bangert, The Times, April 28 (1977) ; Pulling, The Times, April 27 (1977) ; Fuller, The 
Times, November 19 (1980). 
20. Consider e.g. the American Model Penal Code’s defence of “extreme emotional distur-
bance” : aM e r iC a n la w in st it u te , Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Philadelphia, 
The Institute, 1980, para. 210.3 (1) (b). 
21. M. wa s ik , loc. cit., note 15, 35-36. 
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provocation cases, it would perhaps be better if we distinguished between 
different possible pleas that may arise in such cases. Those pleas might be 
either for extenuation or, possibly in some cases, exoneration, depending 
upon the nature of the particular defence or defences raised22. It may be 
22. If the provoked agent loses her self-control to such an extent as to be unaware of the 
nature or quality of her act, or unable to exercise control over her bodily movements, 
then she may be entitled to full acquittal on the basis of a lack of actus reus or mens 
rea defence. Other things being equal, if the provoked agent suffers a total loss of self-
control, automatism may provide the appropriate basis for a complete defence to the 
charge of murder. As Archibald has remarked, “it may be possible to argue in extremely 
exceptional cases where there is some evidence pointing towards the inference that the 
accused suffered a total loss of control, that his conduct was involuntary and uncons-
cious ; therefore, the actus reus of the crime might be negatived and the accused could 
be acquitted on the basis that the automatic conduct gives rise to the defence of auto-
matism” : T. ar C h ib a l d , “The Interrelationship Between Provocation and Mens Rea : A 
Defence of Loss of Self-Control”, (1985-86) 28 Crim. L.Q. 454, 454-455. In those cases of 
provocation where the actor is totally deprived of her ability to control her conduct, the 
victim’s provocation might be regarded as a triggering factor of the excusing condition — 
i.e. automatism — providing the basis of the defence to murder. Thus, although another 
excuse takes priority over provocation here, the latter might be granted a role peripheral 
to or supportive of the defence relied on. Consider here the Canadian Supreme Court’s 
decision in R. v. Stone, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290. Furthermore, in some cases of cumulative 
provocation the accused may be able to plead self-defence. Killing in self-defence may 
be justifed if the accused believed that she was under an attack posing an immediate 
threat on her life. In England an accused’s plea of self-defence is judged in the light of 
the facts that existed or that the accused believed to exist, whether they actually existed 
or not. It is recognised that the accused’s belief need not be reasonable, just honest. If 
the accused honestly believed that she was being attacked, or about to be attacked, even 
though that was not in fact the case, the jury will be invited to consider whether her use 
of force was proportionate to the threat which the accused believed to be created by the 
attack under which she believed herself to be (see e.g. : R. v . Williams (1983), 78 Cr. App. 
R. 276 (C.A.) ; R. v. Jackson, [1985] R.T.R. 257 (C.A.) ; R. v . Asbury, [1986] Crim. L.R. 
258 (C.A.) ; R. v. Fisher, [1987] Crim. L.R. 334 (C.A.) ; Beckford v. R., [1988] A.C. 130, 
[1987] 3 All E.R. 425 (P.C.)). The reasonableness of the force used in defence is a question 
of fact to be determined by the jury. It is upon them to decide whether the prosecution 
has proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused exceeded the degree of force 
needed to avert the (real or anticipated) attack. It is important to note that the question 
of whether the degree of force used in defence was reasonable or not is answered in the 
light of the circumstances in which the accused decided to use force (see e.g. : Palmer 
v . R., [1971] A.C. 814 (P.C.) ; R. v . Shannon (1980), 71 Cr. App. R. 192 (C.A.) ; R. v. 
Whyte, [1987] 3 All E.R. 416 (C.A.)). The jury may be directed to take into account that, 
under the stress of the situation, the accused might not have been able to make out the 
exact degree of force needed to ward off the attack. In so far as the reasonableness of 
the accused’s response to an attack is assessed by reference to her state of mind in the 
circumstances, self-defence would appear to hinge on considerations that are clearly 
excusative in nature. If the accused had been acting in a state of fear, panic or extreme 
anger, no blame is attributed to her for exceeding the limits of necessary force in self-
defence. In R. v . Lavallée, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852, the Supreme Court of Canada held that 
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true that the majority of the claims stemming from the circumstances of 
cumulative provocation would meet the conditions of provocation and 
diminished responsibility or, probably, of an intermediate defence sharing 
characteristics of both (such as a general defence of extreme emotional 
disturbance). Nevertheless, neither provocation nor diminished responsi-
bility on its own appears capable of providing a single basis for dealing with 
all cases of cumulative provocation in law. One would have too high a price 
to pay, in terms of loss of coherence and consistency, if the scope of either 
defence were stretched beyond a certain point to cover the variety of claims 
likely to arise from the circumstances of cumulative provocation. 
In a case involving cumulative provocation, a plea for mitigation on 
grounds of provocation should not be accepted unless all the conditions of 
the defence are satisfed. As was indicated before, from the point of view of 
the excuse theory, this would presuppose that the accused has retaliated in 
the heat of passion and that her reaction was triggered off by a provocative 
incident of some sort. The gravity of that fnal provocative incident or, to 
put it otherwise, the accused’s judgment of certain conduct or words as 
gravely provocative, should be assessed in the light of previous provoca-
tions from the same source. According to Ashworth : 
the signifcance of the deceased’s fnal act should be considered by reference to the 
previous relations between the parties, taking into account any previous incidents 
which add colour to the fnal act. This is not to argue that the basic distinction 
between sudden provoked killings and revenge killings should be blurred, for the 
lapse of time between the deceased’s fnal act and the accused’s retaliation should 
continue to tell against him. The point is that the signifcance of the deceased’s fnal 
act and its effect upon the accused — and indeed the relation of the retaliation to 
that act — can be neither understood nor evaluated without reference to previous 
dealings between the parties23. 
In a case of cumulative provocation, the fnal act of provocation, 
however trivial it might appear to have been, should be regarded as in a 
the defence of self-defence under s. 34(2) Cr.C. could be available to a woman who shot 
her abusive husband as he was leaving the room, after he threatened to kill her. The Court 
recognized that the requirements of the defence must be interpreted and applied in a way 
that made sense in the context of the accused’s history of abuse at the victim’s hands. In 
R. v . Pétel, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 3, the Supreme Court held that, when self-defence is raised, 
the jury should consider whether the accused reasonably believed in the circumstances 
that she was being unlawfully attacked – a reasonable mistake about whether she was 
actually being attacked does not preclude the defence. It was stated, moreover, that the 
attack need not be imminent (imminence is a factor relevant to determining whether the 
accused had a reasonable apprehension of danger and a reasonable belief that she could 
not avoid the threat without using lethal force against her attacker). Consider also R. v . 
Cinous, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 3. 
23. A. ash w o r th , loc. cit., note 8, 558-559. 
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sense epitomising or refecting in the accused’s eyes all the previous abuse 
she suffered at the victim’s hands. In this respect, such a provocation may be 
seen as being serious enough to support a partial excuse. It seems clear that, 
in so far as the accused’s plea in such cases pertains to her loss of control, 
the wrongfulness of the victim’s conduct can only be taken to provide a 
good reason or explanation for the accused’s giving way to anger. Evidence 
of planning should cut against a claim of loss of self-control, provided that 
such planning must be of the kind that results from the distinctive exercise 
of the faculty of self-control. The fact that the accused in Thornton, on 
receiving new provocation, went to the kitchen to arm herself with a knife 
and then spent some time sharpening it, should not have counted against 
her claim that she had lost her self-control. In contrast, an elaborate plan 
to avoid detection should be fatal to the defence24. 
2 Cumulative Provocation and Diminished Responsibility 
Some degree of planning and deliberation is not necessarily incom-
patible with the loss of self-control requirement. However, if the accused 
appears to have regained her composure at the time of the killing her plea 
of provocation should normally fail. In such a case the accused may be 
able to rely on a different kind of legal defence, such as diminished respon-
sibility25, but surely not on one that rests on the assumption that she is a 
“normal” or “reasonable” person26. Diminished responsibility is classifed 
as an excusatory defence, as it recognizes that, although an illegal act was 
committed, the accused’s moral culpability is reduced due to her mental 
instability27. 
24. In the 10th edition of his textbook on Criminal Law, Professor Smith wrote : “It seems 
that the words ‘sudden and temporary’, imply only that the act must not be premeditated. 
It is the loss of control which must be ‘sudden’, which does not mean ‘immediate’” (J.C. 
sM it h and B. hogan , Criminal Law, 10th ed. by J.C. Smith, London, Butterworths, 2002, 
p. 368). 
25. This defence is provided for by the Homicide Act, 1957, s. 2. 
26. In Ashworth’s words, “The defence of provocation is for those who are in a broad sense 
mentally normal. Those suffering from some form of mental abnormality should be 
brought within the defence of diminished responsibility” : A.J. ash w o rth , “The Doctrine 
of Provocation”, (1976) 35 Cambridge L.J. 292, 312. Also see : R. v . Ward, [1956] 1 Q.B. 
351 (C.A.) ; Attorney General for Jersey v. Holley, [2005] 2 A.C. 580 (P.C.). Consider also 
U.K., la w Co M M issio n , A New Homicide Act for England and Wales ?, op. cit., note 1, 
p . 171-176. 
27. Canada does not have a diminished responsibility defence similar to that provided for 
by s. 2 of the English Homicide Act, 1957 that would operate to reduce what would 
otherwise be a conviction for murder to manslaughter on the basis that the accused 
suffered from an abnormality of mind that substantially impaired her responsibility 
for the offence. Furthermore, courts in Canada have consistently refused to allow a 
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As with provocation, when an accused pleads diminished responsibility 
it must frst be established that, at the time of the killing, the accused had 
an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm (the mens rea of murder 
in English Law) before the defence is put to the jury. For the defence to 
succeed it is important that medical evidence is brought forward to support 
the claim that the accused was suffering from an “abnormality of mind28”. 
If the medical evidence supports a fnding of diminished responsibility, 
the jury must fnd the accused guilty of manslaughter only. The question 
common law defence of diminished responsibility. See e.g. : Bigaouette v . R., [1927] 
S.C.R. 112 ; R. v . Kasperek (1951), 101 C.C.C. 375 (Ont. C.A.) ; Chartrand v. R., [1977] 
1 S.C.R. 314, 318. The only statutory recognition of reduced criminal culpability on the 
basis of mental disturbance arises in cases of infanticide, where murder may be reduced 
to the lesser offence of infanticide (ss. 233 and 662 (3) Cr.C.). There are some decisions, 
however, that appear to have recognized mental impairment less than that required 
under the s. 16 mental disorder defence (prior to 1992 the latter defence was known as 
the defence of insanity). Such an impairment was held to be relevant to determining 
whether the accused actually formed the intent for murder, or whether the murder was 
planned and deliberate. See e.g. : R. v . Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, 987 ; R. v . Jacquard, 
[1997] 1 S.C.R. 314, 333. There also appears to be growing recognition of the combined 
use of other failed defences (such as provocation, self-defence and intoxication) where 
the defendant may not be able to rely on any particular defence, but the cumulative 
effect of the defences is suffcient to raise a doubt as to the existence of the mental state 
required for the offence. See e.g. : R. v. Campbell (1977), 17 O.R. (2d) 673 (Ont. C.A.) ; 
R. v. Clow, [1985] O.J. No. 43, 44 C.R. (3d) 228 at 231 (Ont. C.A.) ; R. v. Nealy (1986), 
30 C.C.C. (3d) 460 (Ont. C.A.) ; R. v. Robinson, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 683 ; R. v. Faid, [1983] 1 
S.C.R. 265. However, it would be a mistake to refer to these developments as pointing 
towards the recognition of a diminished responsibility doctrine, for what is the focus of 
the inquiry here is the question of whether the accused had the necessary mens rea to 
be convicted of murder. The diminished responsibility defence, by contrast, arises only 
when the mental element of murder is present to reduce the offence to manslaughter. 
See on this point : R.C. to PP , “A Concept of Diminished Responsibility for Canadian 
Criminal Law”, (1975) 33 U. T. Fac. L.R. 205 ; M. gan na ge , “The Defence of Diminished 
Responsibility in Canadian Criminal Law”, (1981) 19 Osgoode Hall L.J. 301. The incor-
poration of a diminished responsibility defence into Canadian criminal law has been 
recommended by a number of commentators. It has been argued that the introduction 
of such a defence is necessary in order to acknowledge the fact that an offender who 
is legally sane but who nevertheless suffers from some defciency of the mind redu-
cing her moral responsibility for her actions should not be punished as severely as a 
sane offender. See : J. Cassells , “Diminished Responsibility”, (1964) 7 Can. Bar J. 8 ; 
l a w reForM Co M M issio n oF Can ad a , Criminal Law. The general part : liability and 
defences, Working Paper 29, Ottawa, Minister of Supply and Services, 1982, p . 50-54. 
In general, however, there is currently little support in Canada for reforming the law to 
include a diminished responsibility defence. It is argued that the introduction of such a 
defence is not necessary given the broad scope of the mental disorder defence in Canada 
and in view of the problems surrounding the application of diminished responsibility in 
other jurisdictions. See : D. s tua r t , op. cit., note 2, p . 549. 
28. See : R. v . Dix (1981), 74 Cr. App. R. 306 (C.A.). 
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of whether the accused was suffering from an abnormality of mind is ulti-
mately one for the jury, not the medical expert, to decide. In Byrne29 the 
term “abnormality of mind” was defned by Lord Parker C.J. as follows : 
“Abnormality of mind,” which has to be contrasted with the time-honoured 
expression in the M’Naghten Rules “defect of reason”, means a state of mind 
so different from that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would 
term it abnormal. It appears to us to be wide enough to cover the mind’s activi-
ties in all its aspects, not only the perception of physical acts and matters, and 
the ability to form a rational judgment whether an act is right or wrong, but also 
the ability to exercise will power to control physical acts in accordance with that 
rational judgment30. 
As this statement suggests, an irresistible urge, or an inability or 
extraordinary diffculty to hold one’s impulses in check, could be treated 
under the diminished responsibility defence. In Byrne the Court of Appeal 
recognised that mental responsibility for the accused’s acts requires consid-
eration by the jury “of the extent to which the accused’s mind is answer-
able for his physical acts, which must include a consideration of the extent 
of his ability to exercise will-power to control his physical acts31”. This 
question, as being of one degree, can only be decided by the jury. In Lord 
Parker’s words : 
Medical evidence is, of course, relevant, but the question involves a decision 
not merely as to whether there was some impairment of the mental responsi-
bility of the accused for his acts, but whether such impairment can properly be 
called “substantial,” a matter upon which juries may quite legitimately differ from 
doctors32. 
In Byrne the Court accepted that the accused’s condition was described 
as “partial insanity” or as a condition “bordering on insanity”. Judges used 
similar expressions in their directions to juries in subsequent cases, but 
such expressions may lead to confusion as they appear to link diminished 
responsibility with insanity. Thus, in Seers33, the Court of Appeal adopted 
the position that judges should avoid comparing diminished responsibility 
to insanity for there may be cases in which the abnormality of mind upon 
which the accused’s defence is based has nothing to do with any of the 
conditions relating to the insanity defence34. For example, a depressive 
29. R. v . Byrne, [1960] 2 Q.B. 396 (C.A.). 
30. Id., 403. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Id., 404. 
33. R. v . Seers (1984), 79 Cr. App. R. 261 (C.A.). 
34. See also : Rose v. R., [1961] AC 496 ; [1961] 1 All E.R. 859 (P.C.). In this case it was held 
that if the word insanity is used in relation to diminished responsibility it must be used 
in “its broad popular sense” (p. 864). 
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condition may provide a suffcient basis for the defence of diminished 
responsibility, although the sufferer could not be described as insane or 
partially insane35. 
It is required, further, that the abnormality of mind from which the 
accused claims to have suffered arose from one of the causes laid down 
by s. 2 (1) of the Homicide Act (arrested or retarded development of mind, 
disease, injury and other inherent causes)36. Although no clear description 
is given of the causes referred to in s. 2, it appears that “disease or injury” 
most likely pertains to physical injury or illness and that “inherent cause” 
includes functional mental disorder37. Examples of abnormalities of mind 
that were suffcient for the defence of diminished responsibility to be put 
to the jury range from arrested intellectual development combined with 
psychopathic tendencies38, a disorder of personality induced by psycho-
logical injury39, reactive depression caused by marital diffculties40, chronic 
alcoholism41, and “Otello syndrome”, described as morbid jealousy for 
which there was no cause42. Intoxication by drugs or alcohol is generally 
excluded as a basis of the diminished responsibility defence43. Alcoholism 
or the use of drugs may however be relevant if there is evidence suggesting 
that they have caused damage to the accused’s brain amounting to “disease 
or injury44”. Although emotions such as envy, anger or resentment are not 
35. But there is still much confusion surrounding the defnition of mental abnormality in 
the context of the diminished responsibility defence. This confusion stems, in part, 
from the diffculties in drawing clear distinctions between different mental and psycho-
logical states and assessing them in terms of moral responsibility. See e.g. : S.J. Mors e , 
“Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity”, (1984) 75 J. Crim. L. Criminology 
1 ; also see : Dressler’s reply : J. d ress le r , “Reaffrming the Moral Legitimacy of the 
Doctrine of Diminished Capacity : A Brief Reply to Professor Morse”, (1984) 75 J. Crim. 
L. Criminology 953. 
36. See e.g. : R. v. King, [1965] 1 Q.B. 443, 450 (C.A.). 
37. See : R. v . Sanderson (1993), 98 Cr. App. R. 325 (C.A.) ; R. v . Fenton (1975), 61 Cr. App. 
R. 261 (C.A.) ; R. v . Gittens [1984], Q.B. 698. See also : R. v . Tandy, [1989] 1 W.L.R. 
350 (C.A.) ; R. v. Inseal, [1992] Crim. L.R. 35 (C.A.) ; R. v . Egan, [1992] 4 All E.R. 470 
(C.A.). 
38. R. v. Egan, ibid. 
39. R. v . Gittens, supra, note 37. 
40. R. v . Sanders (1991) ; 93 Cr. App. R. 245 (C.A.). 
41. R. v . Tandy, supra, note 37. 
42. R. v . Vinagre (1979) ; 69 Cr. App. R. 104 (C.A.). 
43. R. v . Tandy, supra, note 37 ; R. v. Egan, supra, note 37. 
44. As stated in R. v. Tandy, supra, note 37, alcoholism will only assist the accused if it 
“had reached the level at which her brain had been injured by the repeated insult from 
intoxicants so that there was gross impairment of her judgment and emotional responses” 
(p. 356). See also : R. v. Inseal, supra, note 37. 
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supposed to come under s. 2, there have been cases in which such emotions 
were deemed suffcient to support a diminished responsibility defence45. 
The defence of diminished responsibility operates as a partial excuse 
on the assumption that the accused’s impaired capacity reduces her moral 
responsibility for her actions. But this does not mean that a third, interme-
diate level, between full responsibility and complete lack of responsibility 
should be recognised. Speaking of a substantial impairment of the capacity 
for rational judgment and self-control does not imply that the actor could 
only “partially” perceive the wrongful character of her act, or that she could 
only “partially” control her actions. Diminished responsibility refers, rather, 
to a special type of being responsible, one that presupposes a capacity for 
both perception and control. Due to the actor’s mental condition, however, 
perceiving the character of her actions correctly, or exercising self-control, 
is regarded as being extraordinarily diffcult, that is “as compared to normal 
people normally placed46”. This is precisely what justifes the reduction of 
culpability and, consequently, legal liability in such cases. According to E. 
Griew, for the defence of diminished responsibility to be accepted, it must 
be demonstrated that : 
the defendant had an abnormality of mind (of appropriate origin). This had a 
substantial effect upon one or more relevant functions or capacities (of perception, 
understanding, judgment, feeling, control). In the context of the case this justifes 
the view that his culpability is substantially reduced. His liability is on that account 
to be diminished. More shortly : his abnormality of mind is of such consequence in 
the context of this offence that his legal liability for it ought to be reduced47. 
For the defence to succeed, it is required that the accused’s diffculty in 
exercising control over her conduct was substantially greater than that of a 
reasonable or normal person. In determining whether the accused’s respon-
sibility for the killing was “substantially impaired” the jury are expected 
45. See e.g. : Miller, The Times, May 16, 1972 ; Asher, The Times, June 9, 1981 ; Coles, [1980] 
144 J.P.N. 528. 
46. H.L.A. h a r t , Punishment and Responsibility : Essays in the Philosophy of Law, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1968 (“Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment”, 
p . 15). When we say that one’s capacity to exercise self-control is diminished we do not 
mean to say that loss of self-control is a matter of degree. Loss of self-control cannot be 
diminished without being entirely lost : one either keeps it intact, or loses it altogether. 
The model is not that of a dial that can be turned down, but of a rubber band that can 
be stretched and then will break. It is the model that we implicitly use when we say that 
something inside us “snapped” or “cracked”. 
47. E. gr ie w , “The Future of Diminished Responsibility”, [1988] Crim. L. Rev. 75, 82. See 
also : G.E. dix , “Psychological Abnormality as a Factor in Grading Criminal Liability : 
Diminished Capacity, Diminished Responsibility and the Like”, (1971) 62 J. Crim. L. 
Criminology 313 ; R.F. sParks , “‘Diminished Responsibility’ in Theory and Practice”, 
(1964) 27 Mod. L. Rev. 9. 
368 Les Cahiers de Droit (2007) 48 C. de D. 351 
to adopt a broad, commonsense approach. In general, “substantial impair-
ment” means an impairment that is more than minimal but less than total 
impairment48. 
In practice, when the defence of diminished responsibility is raised, 
its success or failure depends, largely, on whether the jury believes that 
the accused deserves to be convicted as a murderer. This, in turn, depends 
upon the extent of their sympathy for the accused and the circumstances 
and gravity of the killing. As Glanville Williams has remarked, “the defence 
[…] is interpreted in accordance with the morality of the case rather than 
as an application of psychiatric concepts. Where sympathy is evoked […] 
it seems to be dissolving into what is virtually the equivalent of a miti-
gating circumstance49”. This explains why the defence has been accepted, 
despite the absence of clear evidence of abnormality of mind, in some 
cases involving mercy-killings, or killings committed in conditions of reac-
tive depression or association, where the accused has killed in response to 
extreme grief, stress or anxiety. 
Diminished responsibility may provide the legal basis for dealing with 
cases of cumulative provocation that cannot be treated under the provoca-
tion defence. Having been subjected to a long course of cruel and violent 
behaviour, the accused may claim that she was experiencing such grave 
distress or depression as to substantially diminish her capacity for self-
control and, hence, her moral responsibility for her actions50. Pleading 
diminished responsibility, instead of provocation, in a case involving a long 
history of abuse would seem more appropriate where no fnal provocative 
incident, occurring immediately prior to the killing, can be demonstrated, 
or where the accused’s retaliation was preceded by planning and delibera-
tion51. The same approach might be adopted in a case where the conduct 
that triggered off the accused’s fatal response is not regarded as being 
capable of amounting to provocation (i.e. on the basis of the objective test 
as it applies in the circumstances of cumulative provocation). Here the 
circumstances of cumulative provocation may provide a suffcient basis 
48. See : R. v. Simcox, [1964] Crim. L.R. 402 ; R. v. Lloyd, [1967] 1 Q.B. 175 (C.A.) ; R. v . 
Gittens, supra, note 37 ; R. v . Campbell (1986), 84 Cr. App. R. 255 (C.A.) ; R. v . Egan, 
supra, note 37. 
49. G. wil l ia M s , Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd ed., London, Stevens, 1983, p . 693. 
50. Crimes of passion are often the result of intense anxiety or depression leading into a 
psychotic state of morbid resentment or jealousy. 
51. Thus in Ahluwalia, supra, note 12, although the defence of provocation was rejected, 
the accused’s appeal was allowed and a retrial ordered on the grounds that diminished 
responsibility had not been raised at her trial despite medical evidence suggesting that she 
was suffering from an abnormality of mind (endogenous depression) when the offence 
was committed. 
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for supporting the accused’s plea of diminished responsibility, even in 
those cases where no clear evidence of an abnormality of mind (in a strict 
medical sense) can be brought forward. 
3 Pleading Provocation and Diminished Responsibility Together 
In some cases involving cumulative provocation the accused may be 
able to plead a combined defence of provocation and diminished responsi-
bility. The practical effect of raising such a combined defence would be the 
reduction of the offence from murder to manslaughter if it is established that 
the accused was suffering from an abnormality of mind and was provoked 
to lose her self-control. The problem with reducing the accused’s legal 
liability on the grounds of both provocation and diminished responsibility is 
that the basic assumptions upon which these defences are based appear to 
be incompatible : provocation presupposes a reasonable or normal person 
driven to the act of killing by angry passion ; diminished responsibility 
presupposes a person suffering from an abnormality of mind and who, 
for that reason, cannot be called “normal” or “reasonable”. Nevertheless, 
a number of cases may be cited in which this problem has not prevented 
the courts from accepting such a combined defence52. In Matheson53 
the Court of Criminal Appeal adopted the position that when a combined 
defence is raised the jury, in returning a verdict of manslaughter, should 
state the ground upon which their decision is based. According to Lord 
Goddard C.J. : 
It may happen that on an indictment for murder the defence may ask for a verdict 
of manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility and also on some other 
ground such as provocation. If the jury returns a verdict of manslaughter the judge 
may and generally should ask them whether their verdict is based on diminished 
responsibility or on the other ground or on both54. 
As a defence strategy, pleading provocation and diminished responsi-
bility together is considered to be to the accused’s advantage. As was indi-
cated above, the reduction of murder to manslaughter in such cases rests 
on the assumption that the accused suffered from an abnormality of mind 
and was provoked. This would render admissible medical or psychiatric 
testimony that the jury would not be allowed to consider if the accused had 
chosen to rely on provocation alone55. A combined plea of provocation 
52. See e.g. : McPherson, The Times, June 18, 1963 ; Holford, The Times, March 29, 30, 1963 ; 
Whyburd, [1979] 143 J.P.N. 492. 
53. R. v . Matheson, [1958] 2 All E.R. 87 (C.A.). 
54. Id., 90. Also see : R. v. Solomon and Triumph, (1984) 6 Cr. App. R. (S) 120 (C.A.). 
55. See : R.D. MaCk ay , “Pleading Provocation and Diminished Responsibility Together”, 
[1988] Crim. L. Rev. 411, 422. Also see : R. v. Campbell, supra, note 48. 
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and diminished responsibility entails a further advantage for the accused as 
regards the sentence imposed for the lesser offence of manslaughter. 
In a case where the accused chooses to plead a combined defence of 
provocation and diminished responsibility, it is recognised that she should 
bear the burden of proof only as to the latter defence. It should be noted, 
however, that in most cases where provocation and diminished responsi-
bility are raised together the jury may fnd it diffcult to keep the two issues 
separate. This seems true, particularly with regard to some cases of cumula-
tive provocation in which the elements of provocation, abnormality of mind 
and loss of self-control appear to be interrelated or interdependent. 
One reason for pleading provocation and diminished responsibility 
together has to do with the uncertainty that surrounds the application of 
the objective test in provocation. This uncertainty is often the result of 
the diffculty in differentiating between individual characteristics or pecu-
liarities of the accused that may be taken into account as modifying the 
reasonable person test and those peculiarities that lie outside the scope 
of the test. Thus, pleading a combined defence of provocation and dimin-
ished responsibility would be a better defence strategy in a case where it is 
unclear whether the reasonable person may be endowed with a particular 
mental characteristic of the accused or not. 
There may be cases in which the accused’s plea of provocation may be 
accepted independently of the fact that she was suffering from an abnor-
mality of mind — i.e. where the provocation is deemed serious enough to 
provoke an ordinary person to lose self-control and kill. However, in those 
cases where the provocation was not serious enough to provoke an ordi-
nary person, the acceptance of the accused’s claim that she was provoked 
to lose control may be seen as in a sense conditional upon establishing 
diminished responsibility. In such cases the accused may be able to rely 
on a partial excuse if it is accepted that she was provoked to lose self-
control precisely because she suffered from an abnormality of mind that 
substantially impaired her ability to control her behaviour. Here, however, 
the legal excuse turns primarily on the conditions of diminished responsi-
bility rather than on those of provocation. Provocation may be regarded 
as a factor triggering off the accused’s reaction, but not as the true basis 
for the reduction of culpability for homicide. 
A verdict accepting the accused’s plea for extenuation on the grounds of 
both provocation and diminished responsibility might be more appropriate 
where the conditions of both defences are satisfed. One might envisage 
a case in which evidence suggests that the accused was suffering from 
an abnormality of mind and was suffciently provoked — i.e. according 
to the objective test, as it applies to normal people. In such a case it is 
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clear that if the accused had chosen to rely only on provocation her plea 
would have been successful on this ground alone. The same would be the 
case if the accused had raised diminished responsibility only. Unless the 
accused’s loss of control is somehow attributed the conditions of one of 
these defences exclusively, a verdict reducing murder to manslaughter on 
both grounds would be the best way of dealing with the accused’s plea 
here. 
Conclusion 
The fact that the accused did not act entirely impulsively in some cases 
of cumulative provocation, especially in cases involving domestic violence, 
is taken to militate against the availability of the provocation defence. 
However, evidence of planning or the lapse of some time between the 
fnal provocative event and the accused’s response should not necessary 
cut against a claim of loss of self-control in such cases. On the other hand, 
where there is no evidence suggesting that the accused was provoked, or 
that she acted in the heat of passion as a result, as required for the provoca-
tion defence to apply, the accused may still be entitled to a partial defence 
on different grounds, such as diminished responsibility or a new defence 
of extreme emotional disturbance. If evidence suggests that the accused 
suffered from an abnormality of mind and was provoked, provocation 
and diminished responsibility may be pleaded together. Such a combined 
defence may be accepted either on the basis of provocation or on that of 
diminished responsibility or, possibly, on both. The latter should be the 
case where the requirements of both defences appear to be satisfed. 
